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Abstract: This paper examines the importance of agglomeration economies and institutions 
vis-à-vis initial conditions and factor endowments in explaining the locational choice of 
foreign investors. Using a unique panel data set for 25 transition economies between 1990 
and 1998, we find that the main determinants are institutions, agglomeration and trade 
openness. We find important differences between the Eastern European and Baltic 
countries, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union countries on the other: in the latter 
group, natural resources and infrastructure matter, while agglomeration matters only for 
the former group.  
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1.  Introduction 
One of the key components of the movement towards economic globalization are 
international capital flows in which figure prominently portfolio investment, foreign and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI has received the attention of a vast literature that 
focuses on its determinants as well as on its  consequences. Two important theories throw 
light on the locational determinants of FDI. Factor endowments-based trade theory argues 
that FDI is drawn to countries with lower wages and more abundant natural resources, 
while the new trade theory suggests that economies of scale are a driving force of FDI and 
that agglomeration effects often play a crucial role.
1 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the importance of institutions and 
agglomeration vis-à-vis initial conditions and factor endowments as determinants of the 
choice of location by foreign investors in an almost natural experiment setting, namely, 
during the transition from centrally planned to market economy in Central Europe and in 
the former Soviet Union. The former communist countries present an extremely valuable 
and so far little utilized object of research. The transition has been initiated more-or-less 
simultaneously in nearly thirty countries that differ substantially in terms of inherited 
institutions, initial conditions, income levels and reform paths.
 This richness of variation 
allows comparative analysis in a unique situation akin to a natural experiment: a number of 
centrally planned economies set out to implement economic and political reforms, 
applying different strategies and experiencing dramatically different outcomes (in a  large 
number of different dimensions, among them FDI). The collapse of the socialist system in 
the late 1980s created a myriad of investment opportunities in the Central and Eastern 
European and former Soviet Union countries. These economies were industrialized and 
could count on a relatively cheap yet highly educated workforce. FDI is also perceived as a 
catalyst as it could bring not only less volatile capital flows but also the technology and 
managerial know-how necessary for restructuring firms.
2  
Despite early optimism for much FDI inflows into the region, these high 
expectations did not materialize, so far. The share of FDI inflows into transition economies 
                                                           
1 See Wheeler and Mody(1992), Head, Ries, and Swenson(1995), and Kinoshita and Mody(2001).   
2 See Estrin, Hughes, and Todd (1997), Lankes and Venables (1996) and Prasad et al. (2003).    2
has been consistently smaller than those of other developing regions such as Asia and 
Latin America. Between 1990 and 1994, transition economies received 2.1 percent of the 
global FDI inflows, while Latin America received about 10 percent and Asia about 20 
percent (UNCTAD, 2002). Between 1995 and 1999, transition economies received 3.2 
percent of global FDI inflows, while Latin America received about 12 percent and Asia 
about 16 percent (UNCTAD, 2002). Although these flows accelerated in the second half of 
the 1990s, they were still disproportionately concentrated in a handful of Central Eastern 
European and Baltic countries (CEEB).
3 For instance, between 1990 and 1994, the CEEB 
received 95% of the total per capita FDI to transition countries while between 1995 and 
1998 the CEEB share declined to still substantial 84%. 
This paper tries to contribute to two different branches of literature. The first is the 
one on the locational determinants of FDI. One of the most recent developments is the 
incorporation of institutional quality in modeling the location decision of foreign firms.
 
Institutions underpin local business operating conditions but are different from “physical” 
supporting factors such as transport and communication infrastructures. The basic notion is 
that a lower level of corruption, a fair, predictable and expedient judiciary and efficient 
bureaucracy help to attract FDI. Albeit intuitive, data constraints have impeded extensive 
testing of these ideas and constrained existing studies to focus on one sole aspect of the 
issue, normally corruption. In this paper, we examine a array of institutional features and 
try to assess their relative importance.  
This paper also tries to contribute to a second strand of literature, that on FDI in 
transition economies. Past studies have focused on the more advanced countries in 
transition, and more specifically, have favored the Central European countries in detriment 
of those from the former Soviet Union. For instance, Bevan and Estrin (2000) study the 
determinants of FDI inflows into 11 transition economies,
4 while Resmini (2000) uses a 
similar set of 10 countries. In this study, we use a set of 25 countries covering both the 
more and less advanced countries in transition. Hence, our objective is to provide a fuller 
                                                           
3 In per capita terms, these are Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic and Poland. In total FDI inflows, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are added to this list [Source: EBRD Transition Report 2000, p.74 ]. 
4 The 11 transition countries analyzed in Bevan and Estrin (2000) are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.   3
and more complete identification of the factors that affect the success and failure of (all) 
transition countries in attracting FDI.
 One exception is the study by Garibaldi et al. (2001) 
that covers a large number of transition countries. Yet using different variables and   
different estimation methods conclude that FDI can be well explained by macroeconomic 
fundamentals. In this paper, we use panel estimation to suggest instead that institutions, 
natural resources and agglomeration economies are the more important determinants. 
In this paper we use a unique panel data set covering 25 transition economies 
between 1990 and 1998,
5 and report that the main determinants of FDI inflows to these 
countries are institutions, natural resources, agglomeration economies and labor costs. We 
also investigate whether the set of determinants varies across the region. We find that for 
the Eastern European and Baltic countries, institutions, agglomeration economies and the 
extent of economic reforms are the main determinants while, for the CIS countries,
6 
abundant natural resources and economic reforms are main drivers of FDI inflows.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical 
framework on the location determinants of FDI. In section 3, we discuss the variables to be 
tested as the determinants of FDI in our empirical setting, the estimation method and the 
data we use. Section 4 reports econometric results and section 5 concludes the paper and 
outlines directions for future research. 
 
2.  Literature review 
What are the host country characteristics that attract FDI? The emerging consensus is that 
the answer crucially depends on the motives of foreign investors in undertaking those 
investment projects. Accordingly, there are three types of FDI.
7 The first is market-seeking 
FDI whose purpose is to serve local and regional markets. This type of FDI is also called 
horizontal FDI as it involves replication of production facilities in the host country.
8 Tariff-
jumping or export-substituting FDI is a variant of market-seeking FDI. Because the reason 
                                                           
5 The data set constructed for this paper is available upon request from the authors. 
6 The CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, which consists of all former Soviet Union 
countries (excluding the Baltic States) and they are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
7 See Dunning (1983).  
8 The mode of horizontal FDI is typically Greenfield investment.    4
for horizontal FDI is to better serve a local market by local production, market size and 
market growth of the host economy are the main drivers. The impediments to access local 
markets such as tariffs and transport costs also encourage this type of FDI. 
Second, when firms invest abroad to acquire resources not available in the home 
country, FDI is said to be resource- or asset-seeking. Resources may be natural resources, 
raw materials, or low-cost inputs such as labor. Especially in the manufacturing sector, 
when multinationals directly invest in order to export, factor cost considerations become 
important. In contrast to horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented FDI involves a 
relocation of parts of the production chain to the host country. Availability of low-cost 
labor is one prime driver for export-oriented FDI. Furthermore, FDI in resource sector such 
as oil and natural gas is attracted to the countries with abundant natural endowments.
9  
Third, the foreign investment is said to be efficiency-seeking when the firm can 
gain from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities in the presence of 
economies of scale and scope. Bevan and Estrin (2000) found the evidence that this is the 
case for the first wave of EU accession countries
10. Prospective membership of the 
European Union conductive to the establishment of regional corporate networks seems to 
have attracted more of efficiency-seeking FDI after the initial announcement of the 
progress of EU accession
11.   
All these suggest that the countries that possess a large market, low-cost labor, 
abundant natural resources, and are close to the major Western markets would attract large 
amounts of FDI inflows. FDI would thus go to countries with favorable initial conditions.  
Based on a survey of Western manufacturing companies, Lankes and 
Venables(1996) find that the main purpose of FDI in transition economies before 1995 
varied substantially across countries. They find that there had been a noticeable shift from 
the region’s projects to serve local markets to those to serve export markets. Export-
                                                           
9 As reported in Esanov et al (2001), most FDI in resource-rich countries of the CIS is of this type.   
10 The first wave countries they consider are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.  
11 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2002) suggests that, with the accession of various CEEB countries 
envisaged in 2004, the integration of operations by EU transnational corporations will be accelerated and that 
more efficiency-seeking FDI will be directed to the accession countries.    5
oriented FDI was then  expected to increase as the market integration with the EU 
progresses. If so,  we would expect cost factors to become more important. 
Another important variable for explaining the geographical distribution of FDI is 
agglomeration economies. When agglomeration economies are present, new investors 
mimic past investment decisions made by other investors in choosing the location. By co-
locating next to other firms, they benefit from positive spillovers from other investors 
already in place. The usual sources for these positive externalities are knowledge 
spillovers, specialized labor, and intermediate inputs
12.   
The empirical evidence on agglomeration economies is ample. The existing 
literature is concentrated on FDI in the US or US FDI aboard. A seminal work by Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) makes a strong case for agglomeration (and market size) in US 
investors’ location decisions. Barrell and Pain (1999) find similar results on US investment 
in Europe. Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) find industry-level agglomeration economies 
play an important role in the location choice of Japanese manufacturing FDI in the US. A 
recent work by Chen and Kwang (2000) report a similar effect of agglomeration observed 
in China.  
Factor-endowment based theory suggests that inherent differences in endowments 
and favorable initial conditions among countries explain the geographical pattern of inward 
FDI. The only way the host country can affect this pattern is to change economic 
fundamentals. On the other hand, a story of agglomeration economies suggests that once 
countries attract the first mass of investors, the process will be self-reinforcing without 
resorting to changes in policies. In this light, if there is any agglomeration effect, we expect 
that the past stock of FDI will be a good predictor of current FDI even after controlling for 
the classical factors of comparative advantages.  
A growing body of literature that relates institutions and economic outcomes argues 
that good economic institutions are instrumental to economic growth via higher 
investment, higher educational attainment, and lower mortality (Mauro,1995: and La Porta 
                                                           
12 Marshall(1920) argues that industrial districts arise because of technology spillovers, the advantages of 
thick markets for specialized skills, and the backward and forward linkages.  A new economic geography 
emphasizes the linkages effect: users and suppliers of intermediate inputs cluster near each other because the 
large market provides greater demand for a good and supply of inputs. See Krugman(1991), for example.    6
et al. ,1998,1999).
13 We believe that good institutions can also play a crucial mediating 
role in attracting FDI. Thus, the key question we ask in this paper is how important 
institutions and the agglomeration effect are relative to other factors in the host countries.
14   
In transition economies, it is well known that the recovery after the initial drop in 
output level of these countries varied greatly across countries (Campos and Coricelli, 
2002). The economies that recovered fastest tend to be the CEEB despite different inflation 
rates, fiscal deficits, external debts and privatization strategies. Also, these countries had 
been relatively more open to trade even before the process of transition began. The 
favorable initial conditions drew a large bulk of investment at the time of disintegration of 
the CMEA in 1991 and it might have been further magnified by the agglomeration effect.  
In summary, in order to understand the determinants of FDI in transition economies 
it is crucial to specify an empirical model that allows for a combination of traditional (e.g., 
market size and labor costs), newer (e.g., institutions) as well as transition specific 
determining factors (e.g., initial conditions).   
 
3.  Data and estimation 
The data used in this study is a panel of 25 transition countries (the CEE, the Baltics, and 
the CIS) between 1990 and 1998. The number of observations in the complete panel is 225 
(=25x9).
15 The definitions of the variables are found in Table 1. Our dependent variable is 
per capita FDI stock in constant million USD and is constructed from a series of FDI 
inflows reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
16  
Independent variables are drawn from various sources reported in Table 1. 
The time-series aspect is important for our study for at least two reasons. First, the 
agglomeration or self-reinforcing effects of FDI can be addressed only if there is a time 
series of FDI.  In the presence of agglomeration, newly made investment would be a 
increasing function of the past investment already in place. Second, during the time period 
                                                           
13 More recently, Johnson et al. (2000) show that differences in institutional quality of law and corporate 
governance can also explain the depth and severity of the Asian financial crisis. 
14 For instance, Wei (2000a, 2000b) finds that corruption in a host country deters inward FDI substantially. 
15 The data used for estimation is unbalanced due to missing observations in the key variables.  
16 We use the GDP deflator as this was the only relevant series available.   7
covered in our data, transition economies went through comprehensive reforms. Cross-
sectional data would not allow us to take into account changes of the reform variables. 
The cross-sectional aspect of our study is also important. Transition from planned 
to market economy started in the early 1990s in these countries but foreign investors were 
cautious in the beginning. Due to difficulty of obtaining sufficiently long FDI data,  the 
past studies on FDI in transition were often limited to the more advanced countries in 
transition (e.g. the CEEB countries)  that are also the major recipients of FDI in the region. 
In this study, we use the set of 25 transition economies. Adding CIS countries to the data, 
we are hoping to introduce more heterogeneity as well as to incorporate different motives 
of investment which may vary across sectors.
17   
 
3.1. Regression variables 
Classical sources of comparative advantage 
Investors choose a location of investment according to the expected profitability associated 
with each location. Profitability of investment is in turn affected by various country 
specific factors as well as a type of investment motives.  For example, market-seeking 
investors will be attracted to a country with large local market and fast growing market. 
Resource-seeking investors will look for a country with abundant natural resources. 
Efficiency-seeking investors will weigh more of geographical proximity to the home 
country to minimize transportation costs. Thus, the location of FDI is closely related to 
comparative advantages of the country, which in turns affects the expected profitability of 
investment. The classical sources of comparative advantages are input prices, market size, 
growth of the market, and the abundance of natural resources.  
The primary purpose of market-seeking FDI is to serve the host country market. 
Market size is a measure of market demand in the country. We expect per capita FDI stock 
to be greater countries with larger domestic market. To proxy for market size, we follow 
                                                           
17 The main sector for inward FDI in the CEEB countries is manufacturing, while it is the resource sector in 
the CIS countries (UNCTAD World Investment Report).    8
the literature and use real per capita GDP using the chain method (RGDPCH)
18. The 
figures are drawn from Penn World Table 6.   
If foreign investors are seeking low labor cost sites, availability of cheap labor is an 
important reason for FDI. To take advantage of low cost of the labor input, firms can 
justify relocating a part of their production process to foreign countries. We use the 
nominal wage rate (WAGEN) as a proxy for labor cost. We drew the data from UNECE’s 
Economic Survey of Europe. If vertical FDI is dominant, we expect a negative sign on the 
coefficient (e.g. countries with lower labor costs would  attract more FDI.)   
Potential foreign investors should be concerned not only with the cost of labor but 
also with the quality of labor. A more educated labor force can learn and adopt new 
technology faster and the cost of training local workers would less for investing firms. Our 
labor quality index is general secondary education enrollment rate (EDU) collected by 
UNICEF. 
The CIS countries (e.g., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia) receive much FDI in 
resource-based industries as they are rich in oil and natural gas. In the typology developed 
above, this is considered resource-seeking FDI. Natural resources rich countries may 
attract foreign investment in those industries while they may also divert investment from 
the manufacturing sector.
19 The variable we use is NATRES that indicates if the host 
country is ‘poor’(=0), ‘moderate’(=1), and ‘rich’(=2) in natural resources.
20   
Proximity to the home country is an important factor in explaining the volume of 
trade flows between countries in a gravity model.
21 It is a stylized fact in the empirical 
literature that trade volumes between two countries are a function of both income levels of 
the two countries (GDP) and the distance between them. In a gravity model, the smaller the 
distance between two countries, the more they are expected to trade. Distance is a proxy 
for transportation costs, or (economic) barriers to trade. In horizontal FDI, in particular, 
                                                           
18 The base year is 1996.  
19 Gyfason and Zoega(2001) find that abundant natural resources may crowd out physical capital and inhibit 
economic growth. See also Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier(2002).  
20 This variable is constructed by De Melo et al. (1997). We also used more direct measures (e.g.  proven oil 
and gas reserves) but the results were not significantly different.  
21 Mody, Razin, and Sadka(2002) and Portes, Rey, and Oh(2001) interpret the distance as a proxy for 
informational frictions.      9
transportation costs are treated as a fixed cost by investors.
22 The greater is the distance, 
the more incentives there are for firms to relocate production facilities to the host country.  
The proximity may be also relevant for cost-motivated investments such as vertical FDI. 
Note, however, that the proximity in a gravity equation is measured as distance between 
source and host countries (i.e. distance between the headquarters and foreign production 
sites). Yet the current data cannot identify the source country of FDI. Given this constraint, 
we measure the physical distance in kilometers from  Brussels to the capital city of the host 
country (DISB). Distance from Brussels is a proxy for ease of access to the major Western 
markets due to low communication, transportation and coordination costs.    
A good infrastructure is a necessary condition for foreign investors to operate 
business locally regardless of the type of FDI. We use the number of main telephone lines 
(TELEPHON) from World Development Indicators as our infrastructure variable. 
Availability of main telephone lines is necessary to facilitate communication between the 
home and host countries.
23   
Macroeconomic policy and reform variables 
Investment decisions in emerging markets are also influenced by economic and political 
risks. Successful implementation of economic reform by the host government is a good 
signal to investors as stable macroeconomic performance implies low investment risk.    
A record of price stability is a good indicator for macroeconomic stability and the 
progress in market reforms. For example, a history of low inflation and prudent fiscal 
balance signals to investors how committed and credible the government is.  For this, we 
use the annual average inflation rate (INFAV). Most transition countries suffered from a 
monetary overhang and thus high inflation after freeing prices at the onset of transition. 
Those countries that embarked on stabilization programs early also succeeded in bringing 
inflation under control rapidly. The lower the average inflation rate is in the host country, 
the more successful the stabilization program was, and higher GDP growth can be 
                                                           
22 See Krugman(1991). 
23 One alternative for the infrastructure variable is the percentage of paved roads in the country. This variable 
can be misleading: for instance, if there is one main road in the country and it is paved, then the value for this 
will be 100. Thus large values may not necessarily indicate better infrastructure.         10
expected in the short run. Thus, we expect that the more foreign investment, ceteris 
paribus, will be attracted to countries with lower inflation rates.  
Another indicator of economic reform is the extent of external liberalization. We 
use the variable CLIE that reflects a removal of trade controls and quotas, moderation of 
tariff rates and foreign exchange rate restrictions.
24 Trade liberalization and a removal or 
reduction in capital controls indicate the speed and level of reforms most relevant to 
foreign investment among all the available indices of structural reforms.
25 Since trade 
flows are often a complement to FDI flows,
26 more FDI would be attracted to the countries 
with more liberalized trade regimes. On the other hand, if FDI is basically intended for 
tariff-jumping purposes, the more restrictive trade regime may induce more FDI.  
Another important policy variable we use is the index of FDI restrictions (RES). 
Larger values indicate greater restrictions on FDI flows, which implies less FDI inflows. 
The index is constructed by Garibaldi et al (2001) based on IMF Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions.
27   
Institutions 
Host country institutions also influence investment decisions because they directly affect 
business operating conditions. The cost of investment consists of not only the economic 
costs of investment but also non-economic costs such as bribery and time lost in dealing 
with local authorities. To assess business operation conditions of the host country for 
investors, we use two institutional variables, 'rule of law' (RULELAW) and 'quality of 
bureaucracy' (BUROQUAL).
  The indicator for rule of law reflects the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law.
28 The higher score in 
                                                           
 
24 The index is constructed by De Melo et al. (1997).  
25 Cumulative internal liberalization index (CLII) and cumulative private sector condition index (CLIP) were 
also tested. Due to high multicollinearity, CLII and CLIP are dropped.   
26 Empirical studies find that manufacturing FDI flows complement trade flows. See Caves(1996) and Sigh 
and Jun(1995).  
27 The index covers the categories on approval requirements, the extent to which profits can be remitted 
abroad, ease in liquidating assets, and preferential treatment of direct investment. See Appendix in Garibaldi 
et al. (2001). 
28 It reflects the degree to which citizens are willing to accept the established institutions for making and 
implementing laws and adjudicating disputes.   11
the rule of law implies better legal institutions. We expect that countries with better legal 
infrastructure will be able to attract more FDI.  
The variable on the quality of the bureaucracy
29 is constructed from two indicators: 
(i) the extent to which the national bureaucracy enjoys autonomy from political pressure in 
a stable manner and whether or not it has an effective mechanism for recruiting and 
training, and (ii) the ease of regulations concerning licensing requirements and labor, 
environmental, consumer safety, and worker health. High values for this variable implies  
lower cost for foreign investors because uncorrupt government with modest regulations is 
less likely to ask for bribery and side payments.   
 Agglomeration economies 
Agglomeration economies emerge when there are benefits from co-locating near other 
economic units due to positive externalities. In the present study, foreign investors may be 
attracted to countries with existing concentrations of other foreign investors. Being less 
knowledgeable of local environments of the country, investors may consider the 
investment decisions by others as a good signal of favorable conditions and emulate the 
decision to reduce uncertainty. 
The theoretical literature refers to three sources of positive externalities that lead to 
the spatial clustering of investors. First, technology spillovers can be shared among foreign 
investors among various industries. General and/or technical information about how to 
operate efficiently in the host country is usually obtained by direct experiences of 
investors. This knowledge can be passed onto other foreign firms by informal 
communication. To benefit from such knowledge spillovers, firms have to locate close to 
others. Second, industry-specific localization is observed when firms in the same industry 
draw on a shared pool of skilled labor and specialized input suppliers.
 Third, the theory of 
new economic geography emphasizes backward and forward linkages as a source of 
agglomeration
30. Users and suppliers of intermediate inputs cluster near each other because 
the large market provides greater demand for a good and supply of inputs. 
                                                           
29 BUROQUAL is close to one of the three corruption measures used by Wei (2000a, 2000b).  
30 See Krugman (1991).   12
In order to be able to distinguish precisely between different types of 
agglomeration economies, we would need more disaggregated data (say at the industry 
level) as well as more on the identify of the investors. With the aggregate data we have 
available, we can lump them all together by using a single variable, the one-year lagged 
FDI stock,
31 which is the approach used in most of the literature (Cheng and Kwan, 2000).      
Note that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side makes the 
OLS estimator inconsistent (we address this issue below). 
 Initial Conditions 
Prior to the start of transition, the countries in our sample varied greatly in the initial level 
of development, macroeconomic distortions, and integration into the trading system of the 
socialist countries. De Melo et al (1997) argue that such initial conditions play an 
important role in determining economic performance among transition economies.
32  
Initial conditions reflect determinants that are unrelated to policies and invariant 
during the sample period. For example, these include initial income level, the degree of 
industrial distortions, urbanization, natural resource endowment, and trade dependence 
(trade dependence is trade shares in GDP measured in 1989).  Among these variables, we 
report results for natural resource endowment (NATRES) and trade dependence 
(TRADDEP) in our regressions. 
33   
 
3.2. Estimation method 
To test for agglomeration effects, we relate current FDI stock to past FDI stock along with 
other explanatory variables. We follow the model proposed by Cheng and Kwan (2000) in 
which they formulate the role of past FDI values as a process of partial stock adjustment. 
We assume that it takes time for FDI to adjust to equilibrium or desired level. The 
adjustment process is postulated as follows:  
 
                                                           
31 We tried to distinguish different types of agglomeration by including the interaction terms of 
agglomeration with the share of the industry and urbanization at the initial year. But none of them were 
significant.  
32 Campos and Kinoshita(2002) find that both initial income level and FDI are important determinants of  
growth for 25 transition economies.   
33 Other initial conditions were tested but none of them were statistically significant.    13
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it Y is an equilibrium level or a steady-state level of the FDI 
stock. By rearranging the above, we get:  
 
*
1 ) 1 ( it it it Y Y Y α α + − = −     (2) 
 
where  α  must be less than 1 for stability. The steady-state level of the FDI stock is 
determined by  it X , a vector of economic, policy, and institutional variables discussed in 
the previous subsections.  That is:  
 
it it it v X Y + = β
*     (3)       
 
where  it v  is an error term that includes the country-specific as well as a time-specific 
effects. The regression model we will estimate thus is:   
 
it t i it
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γ η ε
ε λ δ 1        (4) 
 
where  , 1 α δ − = , αβ λ = and  it it v α ε = . Also,  i η is the country specific attributes and  t γ  is 
a time-specific attribute (e.g. time dummies). If there is an agglomeration effect or a 
positive feedback effect, then δ  is expected to be positive.  
Because the lagged  1 − it Y  and the time-invariant country-specific attribute  i η  are 
correlated, the OLS estimate is inconsistent. In order to solve this problem, we take a first 
difference:  
 
it it it it X Y Y ε λ δ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ −1    (5) 
   14
However,  1 − ∆ it Y  and  it ε ∆  are still correlated. To get consistent estimates, we employ the 
IV estimates, or the generalized method of moments (GMM) proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). GMM has advantages over the standard IV estimates because as the length of 
the panel increases, so does the number of valid instruments. For equation (5), valid 
instruments are lagged levels of dependent variables,  s it Y −  where  2 ≥ s and  . ,..., 4 , 3 T t =    
If  it X  is strictly exogenous, then  s it X − ∆  (for all s) can be used as additional instruments to 
increase the efficiency of the estimates. The validity of instruments is checked by the 
Sargan test. The second-order correlation of the error term in the first-differenced equation 
is checked by Arellano-Bond statistics for autocorrelation, which is asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1).  
For a number of observations that is small relative to that of parameter estimates, 
however, we should be concerned with small sample bias being introduced in the GMM 
estimation. Because the data set we employ may suffer from such a bias, we report fixed-
effects model and compare with those obtained from GMM where appropriate. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we discuss our econometric results. As mentioned, our objective is to 
provide a more comprehensive description of the rationale of foreign firms to invest in 
transition economies. To do so, we try to go beyond the traditional factors identified in the 
literature (e.g., labor and transportation costs) and incorporate in the analysis both 
agglomeration effects and the role of institutions. We argue that the omission of such  
factors can bias existing results. Our dependent variable  it Y  is per capita FDI stock
34 in 
constant million USD in year t.  
Host country characteristics as FDI determinants 
Table 2 reports the regression results for all countries in our sample. The first column 
presents the fixed effects model
35 and the second and third columns show the GMM 
estimations. All regressions include year dummies to control for time variation due to 
                                                           
34One alternative is to use the ratio of FDI to GDP. In transition economies, GDP is quite volatile during the 
initial years of transition. Thus, we prefer to choose per capita FDI to FDI/GDP.       15
changes in external economic environment common across countries.  
In the past, models often exclude agglomeration effects as a determinant. In reality, 
it generally takes time for the stock of FDI to reach the optimal level. The introduction of 
agglomeration and partial adjustment mechanism lends itself to straightforward 
econometric implementation by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. (Cheng and 
Kwan, 2000) 
In the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side, OLS yields 
inconsistent estimates as the lagged dependent variable is endogenous. To address this 
issue, we also report the GMM results in Table 2
36. In small samples such as ours, the 
GMM estimators may not be very efficient. Alongside the results from GMM, we also 
report the fixed-effects model for comparisons.  
Table 2 reports the results for the pooled sample. In column I, we have the fixed 
effects model, the coefficient of the lagged FDI δ  is 0.81. The coefficient of partial 
adjustment  α is thus 0.19. This means that net investment in one year is 19% of the 
difference between Y* and Y. If the steady-state level of the FDI stock does not change, it 
will take about five years for the gap between the equilibrium and the current FDI stock to 
close.  The partial adjustment coefficient is somewhat reduced in size in columns II and III 
in the GMM and ranges from 0.21 to 0.25. Since the lower α  implies the slower speed of 
adjustment, we see large persistence in the pattern of FDI in these transition economies.  
Two specification tests in the GMM show a mixed result in column II.  The p-value 
of the Sargan test is 0.001 and we reject the null that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. However, second-order serial correlation is not detected according to the SOC test, 
which implies the model is correctly specified in this respect.  
One possibility is that some of our independent variables are not strictly exogenous. 
For example, the error term in the current period  might affect future changes in real GDP 
and wage
37. We experimented with different sets of the variables and cannot reject that  
                                                                                                                                                                                
35 The Hausman test rejects the random effects model.  
36 On GMM estimation, see Arellano and Bond(1991), Ahn and Schmidt(1995, 1997). 
37 Cheng and Kwan(2000) test for strict exogeneity of the four variables, income, wage, education, and 
infrastructure and they find that the first two are endogenous, or  weakly exogenous in explaining FDI in 
Chinese regions.       16
market size and labor cost are predetermined. Column III reports the results for the GMM 
estimates when market size and labor cost are treated as weakly exogenous. The Sargan 
test shows that we can no longer reject that instruments are valid in column III.  
Comparing columns II and III, most coefficients are reasonably constant. One 
should note that,  by using more instrumental variables, we recover what we initially found 
in the fixed-effects model in column III, particularly the significance of external 
liberalization and rule of law.  
The results also indicate that FDI into the region consists of the various types of 
FDI discussed before. For example, the coefficient of market size is 0.01 throughout 
different specifications: an increase in real GDP by 1% leads to 0.1 % increase in per 
capita FDI.  That is, foreign investors are indeed attracted to a large size of domestic 
market (market-seeking FDI). Market size becomes insignificant, however, in the GMM, 
which implies that market-seeking motives may not be a robust finding in these countries. 
The lower cost sites also attract FDI as seen in a negative sign on labor cost.   
Lankes and Venables(1996) find for the first half of the 1990s that FDI in the region was 
mostly market-seeking. They argue that, as the region integrates into European production 
networks, we would observe more export-oriented FDI. Our finding is consistent with their 
prediction for the second half of the 1990s.     
Another important explanatory variable among traditional variables is the 
abundance of natural resources. Since it is a qualitative variable, we cannot interpret its 
elasticity on FDI.  But the finding on natural resources
38, or resource-seeking FDI is 
robust. Resource rich countries are mostly among the CIS such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. For these countries, the abundance of natural 
resources may be one of the most important drivers of FDI. We will discuss further in the 
next subsection.   
The results on reform, policy and institutional variables are striking. Most of these 
                                                           
38 All time-invariant variables (natural resources, distance from Brussels, trade dependence and restrictions 
on FDI) drop out after first-differencing, so we first transform them by multiplying by a time trend. The 
similar coefficients are obtained when we reetimate them by using the individual means of Y and X over 
time. See Hsiao(1986) for further discussion.  
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variables turn out to be positive and significant.  
There are two trade related variables used in our regressions. One is the reform 
variable, cumulative external liberalization index. The other is trade dependence that 
measures trade openness. Not surprisingly, external liberalization contributes not only to 
an increase in trade volume but also greater inflows of FDI.   
Greater trade openness also contributes to more FDI inflows. In emerging 
economies that are newly opening up, insufficient information on local conditions 
increases uncertainty and risks of the investment. Via goods trade, potential foreign 
investors may become better informed of local conditions and more encouraged to invest 
in the country they know better. Our result is consistent with the notion that FDI flows 
often complements trade flows.  
Turning to institutional variables, there is a strong indication that the countries with 
good institutions managed to attract more inflows of FDI.  Good legal system and its 
enforcement reflected in high scores of rule of law assures that investors’ rights will be 
more likely to be protected and thus they are able to collect profits from their investment 
projects.   
The other institution variable the quality of bureaucracy reflects the level of 
corruption and the ease of regulations. The positive and significant coefficient presents 
another evidence that poor public sector institutions, or poor quality of bureaucracy is a 
detriment to economic growth as it leads to lower investment of a foreign source. 
We also find that restrictions on FDI are negative and significant, which  implies 
that capital controls for direct foreign investment such as approval requirements and 
restrictions on profit remittance abroad are a deterrence for inward FDI. In this sense, FDI 
policy that limits foreign capital inflow is quite effective.     
On the other hand, variables such as the level of education and infrastructure are 
found to be insignificant, though they have the expected sign. A insignificant coefficient 
on education is different from Noorbakhsh et al  (2001) finding that high labor quality is an 
important determinant of FDI. Their argument is based on the fact that an increasing 
number of FDI projects are undertaken in more technologically sophisticated industries in 
developing countries, which requires higher levels of human capital. This might be true for   18
a broader set of developing countries such as Asia in which FDI is received dominantly in 
the manufacturing sector. This tendency is not observed in the CEEB and CIS countries. 
Another possibility is lack of cross-country variance, as most of these economies show 
rather high levels of human capital.   
A positive sign of the inflation rate is obviously surprising. It is widely accepted 
that disinflation in the initial stage is key factor to rapid transition and sustained growth. 
Countries that have relatively low average inflation rates are expected to attract more 
capital flows as macroeconomic risks are lower in these countries. This result may be due 
to potential endogeneity as it may be closely related to other policy factor: successful and 
swift disinflation generally occurs before the countries liberalize the external sector. 
Overall, we find that FDI into transition countries is driven mainly by 
agglomeration, large market size, low labor cost, and abundant natural resources.   
Moreover, countries with good institutions,  great trade openness, and lower restrictions on 
FDI flows  are likely to receive more FDI.  
Is FDI into the CIS countries driven by different factors? 
The motives of FDI vary greatly across sectors in which the firm operates. For example, 
for natural resource based industries, the primary reason for foreign investors to choose the 
location is abundance of natural resources. For footloose industries that are more export-
oriented (e.g. footwear, garments, and car parts assembling), low labor cost is one of the 
most important determinants.  
    Despite the obvious importance of studies of FDI determinants at the more 
disaggregate level,  the evidence on sectoral differences is rather scarce in the existing 
literature.  One of the few exceptions is the study by Shiells(2003) which reports for each 
of fifteen CIS countries sectoral and source country composition of FDI inflows. Not 
surprisingly, FDI in the CIS countries were mostly in resource extraction or energy 
transportation infrastructure.  FDI in the CEEB, on the other hand, is predominantly in the 
manufacturing sector (Resmini, 2000).  
    In our data set, comparable statistics on sectoral breakdown are not available for 
many countries. Yet we expect  to find different determinants for different sectors in FDI. 
To introduce sectoral differences with this limitation of the existing data, we divide the   19
sample into two groups, CEEB (that is, non-CIS) and CIS. If sectoral differences in the 
location determinants are sizeable, then we would also find different factors at work in 
driving FDI into the two groups of countries. 
  Table 3 shows GMM group-wise regressions. The Sargan and SOC tests show that 
the model is correctly specified.
39 The GMM estimators are asymptotically biased in a 
small sample.  Alternatively, we present results with those from fixed-effects model in 
Table 4.  
  Comparing the non-CIS and CIS countries, we find that there are indeed   
differences between the two groups. First, the agglomeration effect is present for the non-
CIS but no longer so for the CIS. Second, abundance of natural resources is one of the 
most important determinants for the CIS while it is not for the non-CIS. Third, telephone 
lines are significant only for the CIS. Finally, trade dependence is more important for the 
CIS countries. On the other hand, the common factors between the two groups are external 
liberalization, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, and restrictions on FDI.  
  What is also noteworthy is that economic fundamentals such as market size and 
labor cost lose their statistical significance in the presence of reform, policy and institution 
variables
40. Particularly for the non-CIS, inward FDI is explained mainly by the 
agglomeration effect, the progress of external liberalization, good institutions, and less 
restrictions on foreign capital.  For the CIS, in addition to these factors, resource 
abundance and the availability of telephone lines are important. A positive sign on distance 
from Brussels indicates that the geographical proximity to the Western market also plays a 
role in attracting FDI. 
   The different determinants between the two groups may reflect sectoral differences 
as well as differences in the initial conditions of these countries. The greater importance of 
agglomeration in the non-CIS is consistent with greater externalities associated with the 
manufacturing sector because possible positive externalities arising from specialized labor, 
                                                           
39 We also estimated the GMM when market size and labor cost are weakly exogenous. But the estimators 
are similar. Since a small sample bias may be severe when the instrument matrix gets larger, we report here 
the results from strictly exogenous instrumental variables.     
40 The insignificance of market size and labor cost may be associated with endogeneity of these variables.  
We also estimated the model by treating both variables as weakly endogenous but their statistical   
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and user and supplier linkages are more relevant for the manufacturing than for the 
resource sector. In the resource-based sector, investors might have less incentives to 
agglomerate as the more investors in position, the less resources to extract. 
Turning to the fixed-effects model in Table 4, the same results in both groups hold 
up as in Table 3. The sizes of coefficients are almost identical in the CIS in Tables 3 and 4, 
which implies that the gains from employing the GMM might be marginal in a small 
sample of the CIS.  
The study conducted by the EBRD finds that energy resources in some of the CIS 
countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia) have tended to 
generate larger resource rents, which reduces the likelihood of reform as incumbent elites 
appropriate more rents and impedes efficient resource allocation.
41. In contrast, here we 
find that resource wealth can also be a ‘blessing’ as resource abundance is found to attract 
FDI inflows, which not only bring capital and employment but also increase productivity 
and efficiency of domestic industries via technology transfer
42.(Campos and Kinoshita, 
2002).  
Whether or not FDI inflows can provide necessary impetus for further reforms is 
another matter. Natural resources may be a pull factor strong enough to attract FDI 
initially.  But, without sound institutions and trade openness,  FDI inflows may not 
continue as energy reserves dwindle in a country. To extend the benefits of FDI, the CIS 
needs to channel more FDI into other sectors such as manufacturing that is more persistent 
over time in its pattern.  
We consistently find that international trade plays an important role in attracting 
FDI. The significance of trade dependence shows that the more open the country is, the 
more FDI it receives.  For those countries that are not very open, they can do so by 
engaging in the trade reform, e.g. removal of trade controls and quotas, moderation of tariff 
rates and foreign exchange restrictions.  For example, import quotas give bureaucrats more 
discretion as to the allocation of licenses, which may encourage more bribery and thus 
                                                           
41 See Esanov, Raiser, and Buiter(2001).  
42 However, the benefits of technology transfer are more relevant to FDI made in the manufacturing sector 
than in the primary sector.     21
corruption. Structural reforms in trade should be encouraged not only for greater FDI but 
also for limiting the scope of corruption.  
Improved governance reflected in the high score of quality of bureaucracy also 
helps increase FDI flows. Some might argue that energy oil companies are used to dealing 
with corrupt governments and that they may weigh quality of bureaucracy less. But even 
for the CIS,  our results show that good governance encourages more FDI inflow.  In the 
same token, weak legal system including property rights violations is an impediment to 
foreign investment. This may be due to the fact that poor legal system implies greater 
extent of state involvement in the economy.  
In sum, the geographical distribution of FDI across transition economies are 
accounted for by agglomeration, the progress of external liberalization, trade openness, 
good governance, and sound legal system. In addition, for the CIS, the main driver of FDI 
is abundance of natural resources and availability of basic infrastructure such as the main 
telephone lines.  
Although  market size and labor cost are not statistically significant in group-wise 
regressions, one should not dismiss the importance of these economic fundamentals. In the 
current setup, we try to explain the spatial distribution of FDI among 25 transition 
economies, which is a subset of the global market. Within our samples, average labor cost 
is substantially lower than that in the Western market. Thus, we predict that lower labor 
cost is one of the reasons why firms invest in transition countries. Within 25 countries, the 
variance in labor cost is relatively small and this may be why labor cost loses its  statistical 
significance. A large domestic market size might be important if FDI is aimed to serve a 
domestic consumer market. But in our sample its effect on overall FDI flows is rather 
limited.    
  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the factors accounting for the geographical patterns of FDI inflows 
among 25 transition economies by utilizing panel data between 1990 and 1998. The 
location determinants are classified into three categories: the first is country-specific 
advantages such as low-cost labor, large domestic market, skilled labor force, adequate   22
infrastructure, and proximity to the Western European markets. The second are 
institutions, macroeconomic policy and other policies that facilitate business-operating 
conditions. The third is the persistent pattern of FDI driven by agglomeration economies. 
Using the fixed effects and GMM models, we relate per capita FDI stock as a function of 
these three broad categories of variables.  
The main finding is that the most important determinants of FDI location are 
institutions and agglomeration economies that override the importance of other economic 
variables. We also find that the region’s FDI is motivated by abundance of natural 
resources and labor cost. Poor quality of the bureaucracy is found to be a deterrent to 
foreign investors as they conceive it as a high transaction cost which directly affects 
profitability of their investment projects. A similar argument is made with respect to the 
rule of law, which was also found to be an important determinant of FDI in transition 
economies. Furthermore, foreign investors prefer transition countries that are more open to 
trade and with fewer restrictions on FDI as the destinations of their investment. We also 
find that progress on economic reform (external liberalization) plays a large role. 
Finally, FDI motives vary greatly between non-CIS and CIS countries. In the non-
CIS countries that receive FDI mostly in the manufacturing sector, institutions and 
agglomeration are chief considerations for investors. In the CIS countries that receive FDI 
mostly in the resource sector, abundance of natural resources and infrastructure are crucial 
factors.   
     23
References 
Anderson and Hsiao(1981) “Estimation of dynamic models with error components”, 
Journal of American Statistical Association 76, 598-606.  
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond(1991) "Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equation", Review of Economic Studies 58,  
277-297.  
 
Barrell, R. and N. Pain (1999) "Domestic institutions, agglomerations, and foreign direct 
investment in Europe", European Economic Review 43, 925-934. 
 
Berg, A., E. Borensztein, R. Sahay and J. Zettelmeyer(1999) “The evolution of output in 
transition economies: explaining the difference”, IMF Working Paper WP/99/73.  
 
Bevan, A. and S. Estrin (2000)  “The determinants of foreign direct investment in 
transition economies” , University of Michigan William Davidson Institute DP 342.  
 
Borensztein, E., J. DeGregorio, and J-W. Lee(1998) “How does foreign direct investment 
affect economic growth?”, Journal of International Economics 45, 115-135.  
 
Campos, N.F. (2000) “Context is everything: Measuring institutional change in transition  
economies,”  Washington, D.C., World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2269.  
 
Campos, N.F.  and Y. Kinoshita (2002) “FDI as technology transferred: some panel 
evidence from transition economies, ” The Manchester School Vol.70 No.3, 398-419.     
 
Campos, N.F.  and F. Coricelli(2002) “Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We 
Don’t, and What We Should,” Journal of Economic Literature, XL (3): 793-836.   
 
Caves, R. (1996) Multinational enterprise and economic analysis, 2
nd ed. Cambridge 
University Press.   
 
Chen, L. and Y. Kwan (2000) “What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct 
investment? The Chinese experience”, Journal of International Economics 51, 379-400.  
 
De Melo, M., C. Denizer, A. Gelb, and S. Tenev (1997) “Circumstance and choice: The 
role of initial conditions policies in transition economies”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 1866, The World Bank, Washington D.C.  
 
Dunning, J. (1993) Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Pearson Education. 
 
Esanov, A., M. Raiser, and W. Buiter (2001) “Nature’s blessing or nature’s curse: the 
political economy of transition in resource-based economies”, EBRD WP No. 65,  London.     24
Estrin, S., K. Hughes, and S. Todd (1997) Foreign Direct Investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2000) Transition Report 2000,   
EBRD, London. 
 
Fujita, M., P. Krugman and A. Venables (1999) The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and 
International Trade. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Garibaldi, P., N. Mora, R. Sahay, and J. Zettelmeyer (2001) “What moves capital to 
transition economies?”, IMF Staff Papers Vol. 48, 109-145.  
 
Gylfason, T. and G. Zoega (2001) “Natural resources and economic growth: the role of 
investment”, CEPR discussion paper No. 2743. 
 
Hanson, G. (2000) “Should countries promote foreign direct investment?”, Mimeo, 
Department of Economics, University of Michigan.  
 
Head, K., J.Ries, and D. Swenson (1995) “Agglomeration benefits and location choice: 
Evidence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States”, Journal of 
International Economics 38, 223-248. 
 
Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach, and E. Friedman(2000) “Corporate governance in the 
Asian financial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186. 
 
Kinoshita, Y. and A. Mody(2001) “Private information for foreign investment decisions in 
emerging markets”, Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 448-464.   
 
Kravis and R. Lipsey(1982) “Location of overseas production and production for exports 
by US manufacturing firms”, Journal of International Economics 12, 201-223.  
 
Krugman, P. (1991) “Increasing returns and economic geography”, Journal of Political 
Economy 99, 483-499. 
 
Lankes, P. and A. Venables(1996) “Foreign direct investment in economic transition: The 
changing pattern of investments”, Economics of Transition vol.4, 331-347. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) “Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy  106(6), 1113-55. 
 
Lucas, R.E. Jr.(1988) “The mechanics of economic development”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22, 3-42.  
 
Lucas, R.E. Jr. (1990) “Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries?”, American 
Economic Review Paper and Proceedings Vol. 80, 92-96.    25
 
Lucas, R.(1993) “On the determinants of direct foreign investment: Evidence from East 
and Southeast Asia”, World Development 21(3), 391-406.  
 
Markusen, J. and A. Venables (1998) “Multinational firms and the new trade theory”, 
Journal of International Economics Vol. 46, No.2, 183-203.  
 
Mauro, P. (1995) “Corruption and growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3), 681-
712. 
 
Mody. A., A. Razin, and E. Sadka (2002) “The role of information in driving FDI: theory 
and evidence”, NBER working paper no. 9255. 
 
Noorbakhsh, F., A. Paloni and A. Youssef (2001) “Human capital and FDI inflows to 
developing countries: New empirical evidence”, World Development 29(9), 1593-1610. 
 
Portes,  R., H. Rey, and Y. Oh (2001) “Information and capital flows: the determinants of 
transactions in financial assets,”  European Economic Review  45, 783-96. 
 
Prasad, E., K. Rogoff, S. Wei, and M.A. Kose (2003) “Effects of financial globalization on 
developing countries: some empirical evidence,”  IMF Occasional Paper No. 220. 
 
Robinson, J., R. Torvik, and T. Verdier (2002) “Political foundations of the resource 
curse”, CEPR discussion paper No. 3422. 
  
Resmini, L. (2000) “The determinants of foreign direct investment in the CEECs ”, 
Economics of Transition, Vol.8 (3), 665-689.  
 
Shiells, C. (2003) “FDI and the investment climate in the CIS countries”, mimeo, 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Singh, H. and K. Jun (1996) “The determinants of foreign direct investment in developing 
countries”, Transnational Corporations vol.5 no. 2, August, 67-105.. 
 
UNCTAD (various years) World Investment Report. 
 
Wei, S. J. (2000a) “How taxing is corruption on international investors?”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 82 (1), 1-11.  
 
Wei, S. J. (2000b) “Local corruption and global capital flows”, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2, 303-354.  
 
Wheeler, D. and A. Mody (1992) “International investment location decisions: The case of 
U.S. firms”, Journal of International Economics 33, 57-76.   26
 
TABLE 1: Definitions of variables 
 
FDI stock per capita   Cumulative FDI stock per capita (constant million USD) [Source: 
The World Bank World Development Indicator] 
Lagged FDI   One-year lagged cumulative FDI stock per capita 
Market size  Real per capita GDP using chain method [Source: Penn World 
Table 6] 
Labor  cost  Gross nominal wage [Source: UNECE Economic Survey of 
Europe ]   
Education  General secondary school enrolment (%) [ Source: UNICEF] 
Natural resources  Natural resource endowment: =0 if poor, =1 if moderate, and =2 if 
rich [Source: De Melo et al. (1997)] 
Distance Brussels  Distance from Brussels to the capital city (km) 
Telephone lines  Number of telephone mainlines per 1000 people 
Inflation  Annual average of current inflation rate (%) 
External liberalization  Cumulative external liberalization index  
Rule  of  law  The variable “law and order” that assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law 
[Source: International Country Risk Guide] 
Bureaucracy  Quality of bureaucracy [Source: Campos (2000)] 
Trade dependence  Trade dependence as a share of GDP in 1989 [Source: De Melo et 
al. (1997)] 
Restrictions on FDI  The index of FDI restrictions [Source: Garibaldi et al. (2001)] TABLE 2:       
Determinants of FDI : Fixed effects model  and GMM   
[Dependent variable = per capita FDI stock (t)]   
 FE  GMM  GMM 
Lagged FDI stock  0.81 (0.05)***  0.75 (0.07)***  0.79 (0.06)*** 
Market size  0.01 (0.008)**  0.01  (0.01)   0.01  (0.008)  
Labor cost  -0.13 (0.06)**  -0.17 (0.07)**  -0.13 (0.06)** 
Education  1.75 (1.98)  3.04 (2.59)  1.85 (2.01) 
Natural resources  13.49 (4.25)***  18.22 (5.59)***  14.61 (4.96)*** 
Distance Brussels  -0.001 (0.005)  -0.002 (0.006)  -0.002 (0.005) 
Telephone lines  0.51 (0.39)  0.91 (0.53)*  0.57 (0.41) 
Inflation  0.007 (0.007)  0.004 (0.009)  0.007 (0.007) 
External liberalization  40.48 (20.37)*  41.57 (27.70)  41.71 (20.86)** 
Rule of law  6.35 (3.74)*  5.34 (5.02)  7.27 (4.28)* 
Quality of bureaucracy  28.62 (13.04)**  38.95 (16.50)**  27.64 (13.32)** 
Trade dependence  1.12 (0.26)***  1.35 (0.34)***  1.18 (0.30)*** 
Restrictions on FDI  -8.45 (3.23)**  -12.13 (3.94)***  -8.86 (3.40)*** 
N 132  99  99 
R square  0.93  _____  _____ 
Sargan test  _____  0.001  0.906 
SOC _____  0.83  0.93 
 
NOTES: 
*** , **, and *  indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance level, 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in 
regressions.   
Market size and labor cost are treated as predetermined variables in column 3.     1
 
TABLE 3:   
Determinants of FDI: GMM 
Dependent variable = per capita FDI stock (t) 
  Non-CIS countries  CIS countries 
    
Lagged FDI stock  0.54 (0.12)***  0.30 (0.21) 
Market size  0.01  (0.01)   0.007 (0.01) 
Labor cost  -0.11 (0.09)  0.26 (0.23) 
Education  0.88 (3.55)  -5.01 (2.72)* 
Natural resources  0.35 (16.50)  51.20 (10.46)*** 
Distance from Brussels  0.05 (0.02)**  -0.018 (0.008)** 
Telephone lines  0.35 (0.96)  3.22 (1.06)*** 
Inflation  0.06 (0.05)  0.003 (0.003) 
External liberalization  313.73 (131.64)**  142.35 (34.17)*** 
Rule of law  31.27 (14.06)**  26.82 (7.70)*** 
Quality of bureaucracy  56.38 (22.19)**  44.51 (20.14)** 
Trade dependence  0.63 (0.61)  4.99 (1.19)*** 
Restrictions on FDI  -20.38 (7.49)***  -23.00 (7.74)*** 
N 67  32 
Sargan test  0.1301  0.9994 
SOC 0.56  0.75 
 
NOTES: 
*** , **, and *  indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance level, 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in 
regressions.  
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TABLE 4: 
Determinants of FDI : Fixed effects model  
[Dependent variable = per capita FDI stock (t)] 
  Non-CIS countries  CIS countries 
    
Lagged FDI stock  0.64 (0.09)***  0.30 (0.18) 
Market size  0.02 (0.01)  0.007 (0.009) 
Labor cost  -0.08 (0.08)  0.26 (0.20) 
Education  -0.02 (2.87)  -5.01 (2.40)* 
Natural resources  -3.35 (14.22)  51.20 (9.20)*** 
Distance from Brussels  0.05 (0.02)**  -0.01 (0.007)** 
Telephone lines  0.09 (0.82)  3.22 (0.93)*** 
Inflation  0.08 (0.05)  0.003 (0.003) 
External liberalization  264.15 (121.16)**  142.35 (30.05)*** 
Rule of law  28.13 (12.24)**  26.82 (6.77)*** 
Quality of bureaucracy  48.19 (18.42)**  44.51 (17.72)** 
Trade dependence  0.51 (0.52)  4.99 (1.05)*** 
Restrictions on FDI  -15.82 (6.49)**  -23.00 (6.81) *** 
N  80 39 
R square  0.74 0.68 
 
NOTES: 
*** , **, and *  indicate 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance level, 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in 
regressions.  
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Appendix 1  
Summary statistics 
      
  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
FDI stock per capita  188  164  295  0  1771 
Lagged FDI stock  163  131  250  0  1572 
Market  size  165  6955 3249 1012  15170 
Labor cost  151  167  217  0.02  1247 
Education 225  19  8  4.4  51 
Natural resources  225  0.52  0.75  0  2 
Distance Brussels  225  2222  1387  719  522 
Telephone lines  219  162  88  0  374 
Inflation 225  434  1304  -0.8  15606 
External liberalization  225  2.74  2.45  0  9.5 
Rule of law  171  4.47  0.75  3  6 
Quality  of  bureaucracy  225  2.45 1.63 0.83 8.33 
Trade  dependence  211  19  12 0 41 
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Res 
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Lagged  FDI    0.984               
Size  of  the  market  0.556  0.529              
Wages  0.429  0.397  0.61             
Education  0.248  0.234  0.44  0.34            
Natural  resources    -0.275  -0.261  -0.234  -0.231  -0.197           
Distance  Brussels      -0.371  -0.34  -0.669  -0.436  -0.416  0.256          
Telephone  lines    0.4313  0.4178  0.6293  0.4991  0.7676  -0.389  -0.516         
Inflation    -0.213  -0.187  -0.206  -0.225  -0.11  0.1264  0.209  -0.12        
Fiscal  balance  0.2384  0.2034 0.3235 0.3228 0.2635 -0.046 -0.268  0.274  -0.51           
External 
liberalization   
0.6526  0.6404 0.4114 0.6113 0.4828 -0.349 -0.399  0.536  -0.37  0.3084         
Rule of law   0.4614  0.4241  0.2808  0.3890  -0.157  -0.264  -0.187  0.1407  -0.058  0.1494  0.3002       
Quality  bureaucracy  0.5994  0.5724 0.5287 0.1723 0.1215 -0.364 -0.522  0.189  -0.25  0.2117 0.4558  0.564     
Trade  dependence  -0.201  -0.204 -0.431 -0.438 0.102 -0.085 0.398  0.057  0.186 -0.024 -0.321 -0.335  -0.42   
Restrictions  to  FDI  -0.408  -0.373 -0.326 -0.194 -0.062 0.3691 0.113  -0.25  0.028  0.025 -0.215 -0.298  -0.36  0.201  
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